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ABSTRACT 
Global strategic alliances present unique opportunities 
for organizations and their managers to gain competitive 
advantages. This paper proposes a new paradigm for system-
atically thinking about ways to design and implement changes 
in global alliances. We argue that economic factors set 
forth requisite conditions for managers to choose a design, 
but cultural values influence the effectiveness of how the 
design configuration is implemented. 
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During the past several years, much has been written about 
the need for strategic business alliances as a means for managing 
the complexities of world-wide organizations (e.g., Franko, 1978; 
Stopford and Wells, 1972; Harrigan, 1985; Root, 1987; Hamel, Doz, 
Prahalad, 1989; Ohmae, 1989; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; and Lei and 
Slocum, 1991). Popular business journals, such as Fortune, 
Harvard Business Review, and editorials in the Wall Street 
Journal have urged top managers to form strategic alliances as 
one way of entering the global market. Although firms in many 
industries from around the world are now engaging in some form of 
strategic business alliance, the growing complexity of such 
arrangements involves not only economic factors, but cultural 
values. These factors ultimately influence the configuration, 
design, and effectiveness of the alliance. 
Global strategic alliances represent an important series of 
structural designs that enable firms to enhance and redesign 
their information processing capabilities and scope of 
organizational learning when competing in highly complex and 
diversified product-markets. Alliances have become a useful 
platform in aiding many global firms' efforts to manage 
accelerating rates of environmental change and to restructure 
their competitive activities. All alliances may be thought of as 
transition mechanisms that take the strategy of the partners 
forward in a turbulent environment, or more importantly, in an 
environment perceived as h~ghly uncertain by top management. 
Alliances not only help firms manage high levels of environmental 
complexity and turbulence, but also serve as a basis for 
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organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) . Learning 
involves organizational adjustment instigated by a change. Forces 
for change create difficulties for the organization because they 
generate stress that encourages the evaluation of traditional 
norms. This requires reframing of how problems are defined 
(Lyles, 1987) . Effective learning facilitates a firm's ability 
to cope with change and renew their sources of competitive 
advantage. When learning occurs within a change program, it 
enables firms to better "enact" a strategy congruent with their 
uncertain environment (Weick, 1979). The enactment process 
consists of managers creating mental maps that affect their 
choice of strategic alliance, how it is molded, managed, and 
changed. Managers choose--consciously or not--which aspects of 
their environment to enact with their world views, interests, and 
values all shaping this choice. Consequently, top managers tend 
not so much to adapt or respond to an objective environment as to 
define that environment with their particular interests. Top 
managers' choice of their environment is really only a reflection 
of their own organization's design. Successful managers interact 
with their environment in such a way as to facilitate their own 
organization's survival and learning. One important form that 
this interaction can take is the creation of alliances that 
reflect cultural values and perspectives of top management. 
The objective of this chapter is to suggest an organizing 
framework that may help researchers and professional 
practitioners in diagnosing the various issues that arise when 
creating strategic business alliances. Our underlying premise is 
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that economic forces and cultural values impact the choice of 
global business alliance. Top management's task in designing an 
alliance is to use both economic indicators and cultural values 
as sources of competitive advantage to optimize efficiency, risk, 
and learning simultaneously in a world-wide business. Economic 
factors are usually the main consideration for a decision to form 
a strategic business alliance (Reynolds, 1984), but an 
understanding of cultural values is one of the keys to successful 
implementation of an alliance (Lorange and Probst, 1987) . Figure 
1 displays how these two factors affect the choice of strategic 
business alliances and implementation processes. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Viewing strategic global business alliances with our 
framework can be helpful to both managers and academics in 
several ways. First, studying economic factors can help both 
researchers and managers in formulating, describing, and 
analyzing the design requirements for global alliances. Second, 
it can help managers in generating a checklist of issues that 
they must consider in reviewing different potential strategic 
global alliances. Such a checklist can serve as a basis for 
mapping their organization's overall strategy and those of their 
competitors so as to understand the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of both. A third utility of our framework is that it 
can highlight apparent discrepancies between design and 
implementation requirements that may impede necessary change. 
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We have organized this chapter into several parts. First, 
we look at various economic factors that prompt firms to consider 
engaging in global strategic alliances from several different 
theoretical perspectives. Such conditions as economies of scale, 
learning effects, risk reduction and opportunities to shape 
competitors' actions are considered. Second, we focus on the 
critical role of cultural values and how these are likely to 
influence the organization design mechanisms that enhance 
implementation and alliance stability. It is our contention that 
as alliance configuration becomes more complex, the degree to 
which cultural values are mutually understood and managed by both 
partners will determine the alliance's stability. Economic 
factors may prompt firms to consider certain alliance modes, but 
more complex alliances depend upon managing and bridging cultural 
values to enhance stability. Finally, we focus on three broad 
types of alliance configurations: licensing, joint ventures and 
chaebols. 
Wour Economic Wactora Influencing Strategic ~liancea 
In the broadest sense, firms enter into strategic alliances 
because they potentially provide benefits that are not available 
either through arms-length market transactions, internal 
development or outright merger (Porter and Fuller, 1986) . Porter 
(1986) notes that some of the most important factors contributing 
to the rapid growth of alliance activity include resource 
dependency, the need for economies of scale, risk reduction in 
entering new projects, and removing operational problems and 
inefficiencies found in learning new technologies and skills. 
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Economies of Scale and Critical Mass The need to achieve 
economies of scale in critical value-adding activities prompts 
the formation of many strategic alliances. Pooling resources 
increases the scale of activities that could not be achieved by 
either partner acting alone. As many high-technology industries 
face scarcer resources and higher risks of development, firms are 
entering into an array of alliances across different activities 
to build a critical mass or presence in an industry. For 
example, in joint ventures where partners are endowed with 
mutually complementary value-adding skills, pooling their efforts 
furthers the prospect of scale benefits and specialization across 
activities (e.g., General Motors and Toyota's Fremont, California 
plant). Likewise, where partners are endowed with strengths in 
the same value-adding activities, a joint venture could provide a 
new platform that not only improves current projects, but also 
enables future scale-intensive projects to be implemented faster 
(cf. Daimler-Benz and Mitsubishi) . This factor becomes 
especially important as globalization across industries tends to 
increase the minimum efficient scale (MES) needed for state-of-
the-art plants. 
Learning New Skilla and Technologies Strategic alliances 
also represent a useful vehicle by which firms may learn new 
skills, technologies and capabilities from their partners. 
Compared with internal development efforts, strategic alliances 
may help firms gain a new perspective on problems by integrating 
different technologies and skills into new projects that they 
previously could not envision. The scope for faster 
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organizational learning is broadened significantly when firms are 
able to learn from a multiple number of sources (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989) and Ohmae (1985) 
note that many firms enter into joint ventures as a means of 
enhancing their own strategic renewal, learning new competencies 
and/or reducing the time needed for developing new projects. For 
example, Thomson's joint venture with JVC is intended to help the 
French electronics giant fine-tune its skills in manufacturing 
highly precise microelectronic components that are increasingly 
vital to products in a broad range of industries. This alliance 
also enables JVC to learn how to compete in the European market. 
Alliances become network mechanisms (Jarillo, 1988) that transit 
the flow of information between partners and presumably enable 
both to accelerate learning and diffusion of competitive skills. 
Shaping of Industry Evolution Porter and Fuller (1986) 
note that firms in many industries engage in alliances to enhance 
the prospects for collusion, or the evolution of the industry 
itself. In theory, strategic alliances designed to shape 
industry evolution could exert themselves in the following ways. 
First, licensing and joint venture activities diffuse certain 
technologies that require standardization early on in the life 
cycle. These predetermine the path of industry activity. The 
software and computer chip industries are laden with strategic 
alliances designed to promote and standardize certain operating 
systems and processing techniques. Second, firms in very dynamic 
industries engage in strategic alliances not only to help 
amortize development costs, but also position their firms to 
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capitalize on idiosyncratic value-adding activities. In the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, an extensive series of 
cross-licensing agreements exist not only to specialize R & D 
activities across firms, but also to maintain a high level of 
industry-wide innovativeness and dynamism. Third, alliances can 
shape the path of competitor entry and evolution within 
industries as well. Alliances of this type may work both 
horizontally (across firms with similar value-chain 
configurations) and vertically (across firms that are in a 
supplier-manufacturer relationships) . For example, Japanese 
firms engaged in keiretsu alliances seek to shape not only the 
pace of industry growth and globalization, but also to control 
the type of skills and technologies that are likely to be 
developed among competitors. 
Risk Reduction All alliances to some extent are motivated 
by the need to reduce economic risk. Particularly for global 
industries, strategic alliances help firms hedge risks that no 
organization alone could bear. In high-technology industries, 
such as aerospace, telecommunications, computers and machine 
tools, the costs and risks of successive product development have 
risen exponentially over the past decade. Moreover, the extreme 
complexities of integrating many different technological bases 
into a single product class have substantially raised the fixed 
costs of entry and development. The irony is that as many once-
separate industries become more related by way of digital 
technologies and miniaturization (Ferguson, 1990), the 
proliferation in the number and type of skills needed for 
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capitalizing new technologies is often beyond the scope of any 
one firm. 
While the economic reasons for forming strategic global 
alliances are relatively clear, evidence regarding their utility 
for understanding the implementation process of these strategies 
is less evident (Reynolds, 1984; Lyles, 1987). For example, it 
has often been claimed that one source of competitive advantage 
for Japanese firms is the low cost of capital in Japan. Recent 
studies (e.g., Ferguson, 1990; Ghoshal, 1987) indicate that often 
there are practically no differences in the cost of capital 
between these firms. When differences do exist, they arise from 
sourcing and specialization issues among organizations in 
keiretsus. Similarly, the low wage rate in Japan has also been 
posited as the primary reason for the success of Japanese 
organizations that market their goods in the u. S. Once again, 
recent evidence indicates that the Honda and Nissan plants in the 
u. S. have been able to retain practically the same cost 
advantages over u. S. manufacturers as they had for their 
production in Japan. Therefore, evidence suggests that while 
comparative economic advantages can provide organizations with 
competitive advantages, the realization of such benefits is not 
totally clear. Consequently, we believe that a broader view of 
comparative advantages should be taken. One way of taking this 
broader perspective is to recognize the relative advantages of 
the quality of a society's human and institutional resources. 
These "soft societal" factors can provide benefits as real to the 
global firm as the economic factors previously discussed. 
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Consistent with this perspective, we will focus on how the values 
of a society subtly affect the behaviors of managers in 
organizations. 
Cultural Valuea 
During the past several years, there has been increasing 
attention paid to how values of managers affect a variety of 
organizational design issues (e.g. Hambrick and Brandon, 1988). 
Robert Haas, chairman and CEO of Levi Strauss & Co., states that 
if companies are going to , react quickly to changes in their 
marketplace, conceptual (value systems) control must increase 
while bureaucratic controls 
authority to those who must 
decrease. As managers delegate 
implement strategies, mechanistic 
structures will not be sufficient to cope with change in today's 
globally dynamic environments. Values provide a common paradigm 
for aligning a variety of organizational change approaches and 
for learning to take place. 
Our goal for this section is not to review and synthesiz~ 
the common approaches to values, but rather to introduce 
Hofstede's (1980) schema as one way of understanding value 
differences across cultures. His schema is widely recognized as 
one of the most encompassing value systems in our literature 
(Jackofsky and Slocum, 1988). It is expected to aid our 
understanding of the formation and effectiveness of various 
global strategic business alliances. In the next section of this 
chapter, we will indicate how cultural values and industry 
characteristics can be integrated to affect organization design 
and implementation decisions. 
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The values that people hold about what is desirable and 
undesirable are embedded in a culture. A value is a broad 
tendency to prefer a certain state of affairs over others 
(Hofstede, 1980: p. 19). Culture is not a characteristic of 
individuals, but a collection of individuals who share common 
values. The influence of national culture in shaping the values 
of executives has been extensively studied (England, 1975; 
Hofstede, 1980; Jackofsky, Slocum, McQuaid, 1988; Hambrick and 
Brandon, 1988). Hofstede posits that there are four cultural 
values that have consequences for managers. These are: power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, and 
masculinity-femininity. We shall briefly describe each of these 
dimensions and indicate how each affects managerial behavior. 
The effect of these values on the implementation of a business 
alliance strategy will be discussed more fully later. 
Power Distance This refers to the extent to which a 
culture accepts the inequality of the distribution of power 
between people. Inequality can occur in a variety of areas, such 
as social status, prestige, wealth, and the like. The process by 
which these inequalities are manifested differ widely between 
societies. In societies with small power distances, such as 
Sweden, Israel, Austria, and the United States, status 
differences between managers and subordinates are downplayed. 
Under these conditions, subordinates prefer a consultative 
decision style that minimizes the power differences between 
superior and subordinates. 
empowering subordinates. 
Managers in these societies focus on 
The empowering process is predicated 
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upon trust and the subordinate's ability for self-management. In 
cultures where there are large power differences, such as the 
Philippines, Mexico, Venezuela, and India, centralization of 
authority is more common, managers employ a more autocratic as 
opposed to democratic leadership style, and believe that they are 
"entitled" to privileges. 
Uncertainty avoidance Uncertainty avoidance refers to the 
extent to which people in a culture feel threatened by uncertain 
or ambiguous situations and try to avoid them. Hofstede contends 
that organizations use the same techniques as cultures in trying 
to reduce uncertainty. In primitive cultures, rites and rituals 
were prescribed by priests to ensure winning wars or reaping 
bountiful crops. In organizations, rites, rituals, and 
ceremonies perform similar 'functions (Trice and Beyer, 1991; 
Jermier, Slocum, Fry and Gaines, 1991). Rituals promote positive 
social cohesion because they concur with the values of the people 
involved. On the other hand, uncertainty-avoiding organization 
rituals, such as writing memos and reports to document one's 
behaviors, and other pseudo-behaviors may have little positive 
effect on the organization. 
In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, such as Japan, Peru, 
France, Italy, and Portugal, organizations rely on experts and 
outside consultants for specialized advice, adopt impersonal 
control and planning systems based on rules and regulations, are 
highly formalized, and are concerned with employment security and 
not taking risks. In lower uncertainty avoidance cultures, such 
as the United States, Sweden, Netherlands, and Ireland, managers 
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are more willing to take risks, and tolerate deviant behaviors of 
subordinates. In general, there are fewer rules, rituals, and 
formal standards of behavior. 
Individualiam-collectiviam Individualism implies a loosely 
knit social structure in which people are supposed to take care 
of themselves and of their immediate family. Collectivism 
implies a tightly knit social structure in which people 
differentiate between in-groups and out-groups. People expect 
that in-groups, such as clans and organizations, will protect 
their members. Members feel that they should be extremely loyal 
to their in-group. Riesman, Glazer and Denney (1953), in their 
seminal work, The Lonely Crowd, characterize the North American 
culture as strongly individualistic, whereas the majority of 
Asian cultures as highly collective. This broad characterization 
has not changed dramatically since 1953. Countries that Hofstede 
and others have labelled as collective include Taiwan, Korea, 
Japan, Mexico, and Brazil. Those countries rated as high in 
individualism include Netherlands, West Germany, Sweden, Italy, 
and France. 
The level of individualism-collectivism has been found to 
affect members of organizations in a variety of manners. 
Managers operating in cultures that place a high value on 
individualism frequently move from company to company 
(cosmopolitans), believe that the company is not responsible for 
the welfare of its employees, and that higher quality decisions 
are made by individuals rather than groups. In cultures that 
value collectivism, manager& are attracted to larger, as opposed 
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to smaller organizations, attach more importance to one's 
position in the structure than one's discretion to perform their 
jobs, and are morally and socially involved within their 
organizations (locals) . 
Ma•culinity-~emiDiDity This is the fourth dimension along 
which cultures can vary. Masculinity refers to the extent to 
which dominant values in a culture reflect assertiveness, 
acquisition of tangible things, advancement, and earnings. In 
masculine cultures, such as Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Mexico, 
and West Germany, people believe that extrinsic organizational 
rewards (salaries, advancements) are symbols of the successful 
high achiever. Large-scale organizations are popular; economic 
growth is seen as a more important problem than conservation of 
the environment; people should try to excel at being the best; 
and people live to work. In more feminine cultures, such as 
Sweden, Netherlands, Taiwan, and Spain, people place more 
emphasis on cooperation (as opposed to conflict), working 
conditions, employment security, conservation of the environment, 
and working to afford to live. 
The consequences for organizations are several fold. In 
masculine societies, managers believe that the company has the 
right to interfere in the personal lives of its employees if 
needed for the benefit of the organization. Earnings, individual 
recognition, advancement and job challenge are important symbols 
of success. Traditions going back several centuries are honored 
ways of conducting business. In more feminine societies, 
managers practice Theory Y (as opposed to Theory X) , praise 
14 
people through social rewards, use group or team approaches to 
solve problems, and value soft-intuitive skills more than hard-
analytical skills. 
The Interaction o~ Economic• and Values 
Our thesis is that economic factors and cultural values 
interact to determine both the choice of alliance configuration 
and the effectiveness of the implementation process. The 
requirements of managing economic factors, such as economies of 
scale, resource scarcity, and technological change, may prompt 
the selection of a particular alliance structure. The role of 
cultural values, however, has profound significance in enhancing 
the smooth implementation and stability of more complex alliance 
arrangements. For example, licensing arrangements, which 
represent the simplest form of alliance activity, are often 
little more than a formalized arms-length, market relationship 
designed to manage transaction costs across the partners. The 
national values of the partners are of little importance to the 
execution of licensing agreements. On the other hand, the 
success of chaebols in South Korea is embedded in such tightly-
woven and nurtured cultural values that they exemplify a 
different form of alliance. Cultural values are of far greater 
importance than economics for selecting and managing cross-firm 
relationships arid activities in chaebols. 
Proposition 1: Licensing arrangements are driven 
purely by economic and competitive factors. Cultural 
values of both partners are tangential to implementation. 
Proposition 2: In both specialization and shared 
value-added joint ventures, economic conditions of 
scale, learning and risk reduction may induce alliance 
formation, but managing different cultural values 
becomes the driving element of smooth implementation. 
Proposition 3: In chaebols, cultural values dominate 
the choice of alliance partner and implementation 
processes; economic conditions are largely tangential. 
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When considering the growing number of implementation 
difficulties that arise in complex cross-border alliances, one 
finds that a significant factor in managing troubled alliances is 
that of reconciling and harmonizing the different cultural and 
national values that both partners bring with them (Hamel, Doz 
and Prahalad, 1989; Harrigan, 1985; Ohrnae, 1985) . As a case in 
point, many u.s. firms have entered into specialization and 
shared value-added joint ventures with a number of European and 
Japanese partners, only to find that the ventures prove very 
difficult or unworkable because of cultural misunderstandings or 
divergent work and management practices that were not previously 
considered (Harrigan, 1985; Ohrnae, 1985). The numerous obstacles 
that General Electric encountered in its series of alliances with 
Fujitsu Fanuc in factory automation and Samsung in microwave 
ovens are at least partly due to the great chasm in national 
values and agendas that GE faced in its relationships with these 
partners. 
To understand how economic factors and cultural values 
affect the organizational performance of each alliance, each 
alliance must be designed to take advantage of its distinctive 
competencies. An alliance must possess organizing properties to 
cope with its own form of learning. The reason why many 
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alliances fail seems to be that they have not been designed with 
sufficient properties for learning to occur when faced with 
environmental turbulences. 
Table 1 presents the different elements of organization 
design that we will use to understand the five types of strategic 
alliances. We focus on the formal dimensions of structure, modes 
of integration, control mechanisms, reward systems and corporate 
cultures that reinforce the alliance's design. The considerable 
research and literature on environment-organization relationships 
reveal that top management's underlying assumptions of the 
environment are often as important as the actual environment 
itself in influencing organization design (Weick, 1979) . How 
managers enact their environment is a function of their cognitive 
beliefs and processes, as well as the economic forces confronting 
them. The environment is classified along dimensions of simple 
to complex and stable to dynamic to capture the notions of 
complexity, change and heterogeneity (Ford and Slocum, 1977; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; Thompson, 1967). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
D~enaiona of Organization 
We have chosen four structural dimensions (formalization, 
specialization, standardization, and centralization) to describe 
the internal characteristics of each alliance. These dimensions 
are salient because they provide us with framework for describing 
and comparing alliance designs (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings,and 
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Turner, 1968; Ford and Slocum, 1977; Fry and Slocum, 1984). 
Formalization pertains to the amount of written documentation in 
the organization. Specialization is the degree to which 
organizational tasks are subdivided into separate jobs. 
Standardization is the extent to which work activities are 
performed in a uniform manner. Centralization refers to the 
hierarchical level of authority that has the authority to make a 
decision. 
There are a number of mechanisms that managers can use to 
achieve integration. These mechanisms vary from the hierarchical 
chain of command to the addition of integrating departments. We 
have adopted Galbraith's (1973) nine-fold classification 
framework of integration mechanisms. These are listed, in order 
in Table 1, as representing an organization's mode of integration 
from inexpensive and simple to more complicated and expensive 
mechanisms of coordination. Galbraith proposes that as 
organizations choose strategies that are characterized by high 
interdepartmental activity, high environmental uncertainty, and 
high product diversity, they will select mechanisms further down 
the list than those organizations pursuing strategies 
characterized by low uncertainty and diversity. We propose that 
the "center of integration" for each alliance moves from 
comparatively simple licensing arrangements to complex 
arrangements in chaebol alliance structures. 
Top managers can choose among a variety of strategies to 
maintain control. Ouchi (1980) identified three control 
strategies that managers could adopt: market control, 
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bureaucratic control, and clan control. Market control can be 
readily used when price competition is used to evaluate the 
output and productivity of an organization or one of its 
departments. The use of market control requires that outputs be 
sufficiently explicit that a price can be assigned, and that 
competition exists. Without competition, the price will not be 
an accurate reflection of internal efficiency. Bureaucratic 
control is the use of rules, policies, hierarchy of authority, 
written documentation and other bureaucratic mechanisms to 
standardize behavior and assess performance. Clan control is the 
use of values, commitment, traditions, and shared beliefs to 
control behavior. Organizations that use clan control require 
trust among employees. Clan control is important when ambiguity 
and environmental uncertainty are high. Under these conditions, 
the organization cannot accurately assess the price it puts on 
its outputs, and rules and policies might not be able to specify 
appropriate behavior in advance. 
Kerr and Slocum (1987) have illustrated that an 
organization's reward system represents a particularly powerful 
means for reinforcing an organization's culture. The reward 
system defines the relationship between the organization and the 
individual member by specifying the terms of exchange. That is, 
it specifies the contributions expected from members and the 
values and norms to which those in the organization must conform. 
Kerr and Slocum have found two types of reward systems: hierarchy 
and performance-based. Hierarchy-based reward systems use 
subjective indicators of performance, promote people from within 
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the system, stress the deve+opment of the manager by the use of 
movements across functional and divisional boundaries, and use 
informal feedback systems to reward appropriate behaviors. 
Performance based reward systems use quantitative measures of an 
employee's behavior, tie compensation directly to performance, 
and provide few mechanisms of integration between managers and 
divisions. Hierarchy-based reward systems generate clan 
cultures, whereas performance-based reward systems are closely 
aligned with market cultures. 
As alliances grow more complex, the following effects on 
organization design are likely to occur: 
Proposition 4: The "center of integration" is 
likely to move from hierarchy to integrating teams 
as the environment becomes more dynamic and the 
alliance configuration becomes more complex. 
Proposition 5: The control strategy will move 
from markets to clans as the environment becomes 
more dynamic and the alliance configuration 
becomes more complex. 
Proposition 6: Market-based performance reward 
systems are likely to predominate in the more 
elementary alliance configurations; hierarchy-
based reward systems will predominate in complex 
chaebols. 
We have alluded that each alliance is created to achieve a 
myriad of goals. The organizational designs that are appropriate 
for each alliance are now discussed. Each alliance is designed 
to cope with the complexity of its environment, and to provide a 
mechanism for learning. The process of executing its design to 
realistically cope with the exigencies of its environment 
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requires an understanding of the balance between economic factors 
and cultural values. 
Licensing Arrangements Manufacturing Industries Licensing 
arrangements have become more prominent in recent years. They 
represent the least sophisticated form of strategic alliance 
because the partners do not take an equity stake in one another. 
Many licensing arrangements involve co-production and supplier 
agreements in which another firm engages in developing the 
licensor's technologies or other innovations. On a global basis, 
licensing agreements represent a purchase of technology in 
exchange either for market entry into a new region or for help in 
further refinement of the innovation. Some of the most important 
economic factors prompting companies to consider licensing their 
technologies to other firms include: 
* inability to capitalize upon the technology by 
itself; 
* desire to preempt the competition by setting 
industry-wide standards early in a product's 
life cycle; · 
* need to maintain industry-wide discipline and high 
levels of innovation in fast-changing technologies; 
and 
* prospect of lucrative sales and service contracts 
associated with proprietary technology and produc-
tion processes. 
Economic and competitive motives drive licensing 
arrangements between foreign and domestic alliance partners. 
Because licensing is an arms-length transaction formalized in a 
contract or other agreement, its implementation is executed 
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solely through legal and other negotiated channels. The relative 
importance of cultural values in implementing licensing 
agreements has an impact only upon the translation of the 
concepts and terms in the legal document. The alliance is based 
on matching partners' strengths and economic interests. Table 2 
portrays the dimensions of organization design found in 
manufacturing-based licensing arrangements. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Structural dimensions of formalization, specialization, 
standardization and centralization rate high within this simple 
form of alliance. The terms of the arrangement are very specific 
and licensors deal with each licensee using standardized 
performance criteria. This- reflects high levels of pooled 
interdependence. Manufacturing-based licensing is usually 
organized along a geographic and/or technological dimensions. 
This allows for high levels of specialization across a number of 
different licensees to control the pace and diffusion of 
technological development. This factor, as well as the need for 
licensors to delineate the uses of the technology early on, moves 
the "center of integration" close to the well-defined hierarchy 
end of the continuum. Delegation is executed through the terms 
of the agreement. Since licensors, in most cases, are able to 
erect high switching cost barriers with the licensee, control 
mechanisms are well-defined. These are tightly enforced through 
performance-based reward criteria. 
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U.S. firms that have entered into licensing arrangements 
with foreign firms to develop technological innovations include 
Sun Microsystems and N. v. Philips. The Dutch giant has the 
production and distribution capabilties to market Sun's newest 
RISC chips in ways unavailable to the U.S. firm. Sun is hoping 
that its RISC chips, used primarily in workstations and 
, 
computers, will eventually find their way into consumer products 
and other industrial products that Philips also manufactures. 
Licensees can also disseminate the technology faster across 
the industry than could the pioneering firm alone. The desire to 
pre-empt competitors in setting industry standards is a powerful 
inducement to license new and even unproven technologies early 
on. Within the computer industry, for example, many firms are 
racing to license technologies to potential users in an attempt 
to set industry-wide standards early on. MIPS Computer Systems 
licensed its newest microprocessor designs to Siemens of West 
Germany to penetrate the market quickly. It has also signed 
licensing agreements with Digital Equipment Corp., Texas 
Instruments, Cypress Semiconductor and Bipolar Integrated 
Technology of the u.s., and with Fujitsu, NEC and Kubota of Japan 
to produce its chips and market new computers based on its 
designs. 
Cross-licensing is common in industries where R & D and 
other fixed costs are exorbitant, and where aggressive 
competition is necessary for maintaining industry-wide discipline 
and innovation. The pharmaceutical and chemical industries are 
replete with cross-licensing arrangements between global firms to 
23 
amortize R & D costs and to promote specialization of different 
research-based competencies. 
Licensing arrangements in manufacturing industries are 
designed to help firms specialize their activities around fast-
changing technologies. The need to pre-empt competitors' 
innovation efforts, as well as to set industry-wide standards 
early in product life cycles, make licensing agreements viable 
platforms for managing and perhaps controlling the pace of 
industry-wide change. Cross-licensing is particularly useful in 
those industries whose technologies move rapidly and in a 
discontinuous manner. Because technologies are evolving so 
quickly, very few firms can monitor and manage all of these 
changes by themselves; thus, licensing represents the simplest 
way of redesigning firms' efforts to participate and control the 
spectrum of new product development through delegation and 
explicit control mechanisms. 
Licensing Arrangements - Service Industries 
Service and franchise-based firms have long engaged in 
licensing arrangements with foreign partners. These range from 
Anheuser Busch in beverages, McDonald's in restaurants, Avis 
Rent-A-Car in rental systems, as well as numerous hotel chains 
globally. Licensing arrangements in service-based industries are 
especially attractive in mature domestic industries for two 
reasons: 
* establishing an early market penetration with little 
direct investment, and 
* employing a fairly standardized marketing approach 
to create and control global image. 
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As is the case with manufacturing industries, licensing in 
services reflects strong economic and competitive motives. 
Although formalized by a well-defined legal contract, the role of 
values in implementing service-based licensing agreements is 
greater than those in manufacturing settings. Since licensees 
are expected to perform largely on an independent basis with 
local self-initiative, it is important for the licensor to 
socialize managers and other key personnel in the company's 
underlying basic values and philosophies. Thus, some degree of 
value reconciliation and mutual understanding of local practices 
and customs is important to smooth out the execution of the 
arrangement. Table 3 presents the basic organization design 
Insert Table 3 about here 
configurations found in the service-based licensing arrangement. 
Compared with licensing in manufacturing organizations, . 
those in services exhibit less centralization because local 
licensees and managers play the critical role in upholding the 
parent firm's global image through its marketing policies. 
Although the legal basis of the agreement reflects a high level 
of formalization and standardization across an array of licensees 
in different global markets, specific strategies and actions 
taken in any one region or market reflect a high degree of local 
responsiveness. This is made easier when different cultural 
values are understood. Building a cadre of loyal licensees - the 
key to profitability in many cases depends upon their 
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familiarization and adherence to company procedures specified in 
the agreement. This factor becomes especially important when 
services or consumer-driven products require extensive training 
and high-level managerial skills for successful implementation. 
A strong level of corporate-imposed direction and policies is 
found in the alliance. The "center of integration" is achieved 
through the hierarchy. Socialization of local managers becomes 
important in managing highly image-sensitive businesses (e.g., 
restaurants and hotels) • The reward system will have many of the 
characteristics of a performance-based system. Because the 
licensor remains geographically distant from individual licensee 
operations, socialization mechanisms that provides guidance for 
independent action aside from the contract are salient. 
Desiring to enter new markets quickly and without 
substantial capital investment, U.S. consumer foods giants have 
actively trained and worked with licensees to develop customized 
marketing programs in each region without compromising overall 
global image. By building up a strong cadre of loyal licensees, 
U.S. firms have been able to build a substantial and sustainable 
global presence. This has helped to outflank domestic rivals at 
home with less international presence. Avis, for example, has 
franchisees throughout the world that use the company's logo and 
specific corporate-developed procedures in exchange for royalty 
fees. In addition to a thorough training program, Avis maintains 
tight financial and marketing control over franchisees' 
activities to ensure high levels of performance, often measured 
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along quantitative assessments of profitability and customer 
satisfaction. 
As is the case with manufacturing industries, licensing in 
services is designed to help the parent firm develop a global 
presence through careful partner selection, delegation, and 
performance-based reward systems. Services-based licensing is 
especially useful in helping the parent firm learn of early 
changes and new trends that occur in different regional markets, 
since licensees provide considerable data on customer 
preferences, tastes, and requirements. Since successful licensing 
in services and franchises depends upon a high level of loyalty 
and commitment, many firms have redesigned their training and 
development programs to ensure that licensees are thoroughly 
familiar with corporate philosophy, values, and procedures. 
Joint Ventures - runctional Specialization 
The vast number of global joint ventures consummated over 
the past few years heralds a recognition that more sophisticated 
alliances are needed to compete in many of today' s capital-
intensive and fast-moving industries. Joint ventures that 
specialize activities across partners involve creating a new 
entity in which each partner brings and contributes a distinctive 
competence in particular value-adding activity (e.g., one 
produces, another markets). These ventures are closely 
associated with the "X-form" described by Porter and Fuller 
(1986). The complementary strengths of both partners helps 
reduce the amount of capital investment and risk that one partner 
would otherwise have to face alone. Although specific 
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configurations of specialization ventures will differ according 
to mission and industry, they share the same underlying economic 




need for quasi-vertical integration with low 
levels of investment intensity; 
economies of scale and scope in value-adding 
activities; and 
learning a partner's core competence 
or skill or to gain market access. 
While these economic and competitive motives may induce 
firms to consider specialization joint ventures, the 
understanding and harmonization of different cultural values 
become critical to smooth implementation and alliance stability. 
Even though switching costs for both partners is likely to be 
high because of complementary strengths, these alliances can face 
many rough obstacles to smooth implementation when different 
cultural values are meshed without careful planning. 
Table 4 presents the structural and integrative dimensions 
of organization design for specialization joint ventures. These 
Insert Table 4 about here 
ventures reflect a high level of specialization according to 
their partners' complementary distinctive competencies. Where 
one partner manufactures whi'le the other partner controls market 
access, a specialization venture is likely to ensue. This is 
particularly salient when both firms face increasing resource 
scarcity and high risk in translating innovations into new 
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products. Levels of standardization and formalization will vary 
across specific ventures, but range in the middle. The need for 
partners to understand one another's different operating 
procedures, quality standards, planning processes and reporting 
relationships must become understood over time. These ventures 
are also likely to exhibit a medium degree of centralization, 
since day-to-day contact along functional lines requires a 
sequential planning that is frequently adjusted. The "center of 
integration" in specialization joint ventures will move more 
towards linking roles and away from hierarchies found in 
licensing arrangements. Integration depends not only formal 
structure but also on efforts of key personnel (e.g., design 
engineers, manufacturing personnel, etc.) for effective 
delegation, since many of these ventures are organized along 
crucial value-adding functions. Integration is particularly 
important when the joint venture involves organizations from two 
different national cultures. On the one hand, the economic 
imperatives of specialization ventures mandate high levels of 
functional coordination; 
skills across partners 
yet, managing flows of technology and 
from different cultural backgrounds 
depends upon managers that can understand and trust one another 
only after long personal contact and socialization. Reward 
systems are also likely to reflect the dual needs of balanced 
economic contributions from both partners, as well as the 
intracacies of learning and skill transfers. 
Examples of how specialization ventures must reconcile both 
economic motives for creating the alliance and harmonizing 
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different national values for smooth implementation include that 
of JVC-Thomson (Japan-France) and Ford-Mazda (U.S. -Japan) • In 
both cases, each partner needed the others' value-adding 
capabilities which it did not have. They also faced the 
implementation issues of meshing two different cultures. The 
need for harmonizing the different cultures within the alliance 
influenced the way technology flowed between the partners and how 
learning new skills occurred. 
In the Thomson-JVC case, a French electronics and defense 
firm teamed up with a Japanese consumer electronics giant in 
order to learn the latter's ·skills in precision manufacturing of 
microelectronics. JVC desired to learn how to produce and market 
to an increasingly important European marketplace. As a national 
firm strongly influenced and once controlled by the French 
government, Thomson is likely to have embodied many of the macro-
cultural characteristics described by Hofstede (1980): high 
power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and medium masculinity. JVC, 
medium to high 
a well-entrenched 
Japanese firm, exhibited the national culture of Japan: medium 
power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, medium individualism 
and high masculinity. The meshing of these disparate cultural 
dimensions reflected itself in the way both firms viewed their 
partnership. Thomson designed the alliance in a way so that 
sufficiently high levels of organizational learning could occur 
(reflecting high uncertainty avoidance), while JVC attempted to 
control the flow of technology in a measured approach (also 
reflecting high uncertainty avoidance) . Both partners found 
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working with one another also reflected the high levels of 
corporate training and development practiced in each company 
(medium individualism). The strong direct interest in the 
venture's success reflected each society's high uncertainty 
avoidance. 
The Ford-Mazda relationship exemplifies a specialization 
venture focusing on design and production value-adding 
activities. Ford believed it needed Mazda's highly sophisticated 
skills in designing and producing a new generation of small, 
compact cars. Mazda needed not only Ford's access to the u.s. 
market, but its U.S. production facilities to bypass possible 
quotas and to lower costs. Escort cars designed by Mazda and 
assembled by Ford in Michigan are the product of this 
specialization joint venture. 
both partners bring to the 
The different national values that 
venture are likely to manifest 
themselves in the alliance's implementation. The u.s., according 
to Hofstede, has a low to medium power distance, low to medium 
uncertainty avoidance, high individualism and high masculinity. 
Japan rates medium on power distance, high on uncertainty 
avoidance, medium on individualism and high on masculinity. The 
meshing of these different cultural bases implies that both 
partners may not view their participation in the venture with the 
same underlying assumptions. High uncertainty avoidance 
indicates that the Japanese find technology transfers to a 
foreign partner to be a risky proposition, since it may create a 
new competitor. On the other hand, low uncertainty avoidance for 
Ford managers means learning- as much as possible from its foreign 
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partner. An alliance blending differences on this dimension 
means that application of technology and learning may not occur 
equally in both partners. A difference in individualism scores 
also could raise problems in implementation as well. Japanese 
management practices encourage conformity and adherence to plans. 
In contrast, u.s. managers typically prefer to make changes in 
plans along the way. 
Even before the car was made, there were implementation 
problems. Mazda engineers wanted to get the car designed and 
produced as quickly as possible. Their entire design and 
production was driven by tight deadlines. No one ever missed them 
(high uncertainty avoidance) . When Ford engineers were even just 
a few days late, the Mazda engineers were absolutely furious at 
them. Many Ford engineers had to work 80 hours a week to make 
sure that deadlines weren't passed. Ford engineers also found an 
absence of bureaucracy at Mazda. While Ford engineers spent time 
sending ideas up the hierarchy for review and getting approvals, 
their counterparts at Mazda did almost no paperwork. Once the 
design was approved by senior management, that was it (high power 
distance). There were no revisions made or offered by 
subordinates. 
To the extent that partners show considerable differences 
along cultural dimensions, the more integrative efforts are 
needed to understand and reconcile them for alliance stability. 
The JVC-Thomson partnership reflects both organizations' high 
levels of uncertainty avoidance, particularly on matters of 
learning skills and technologies. The Ford-Mazda relationship 
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reflects the mutual need by both partners for critical skills, 
but also the potential for asymmetric learning and other 
conflicting patterns of decision-making that emanate from 
differences in individualism and other dimensions. 
Specialization-based joint ventures help accelerate many 
firms' efforts to change and refocus their value-adding 
activities by renewing sources of competitive advantage. The 
Thomson-JVC and Mazda-Ford ventures expand both firms' 
organizational learning potential in ways that neither firm could 
more easily undertake alone. In each case, partners are able to 
learn new skills and technological refinements from the other, 
especially in global industries, such as automobiles and consumer 
electronics, where manufacturing technologies are becoming ever 
more sophisticated. In addition, specialization ventures provide 
firms with a window on new technologies and production methods 
utilized by their partners. This form of external alliance-based 
learning greatly complements internal formal R & D efforts to 
develop and nurture critical core competences for competitive 
advantage. Unlike licensing agreements, which are implemented 
essentially through contracts, successful learning of new skills 
in specialization ventures requires both firms to recognize the 
potent differences in the partners' underlying national values 
and to design the alliance carefully around them. 
Joint Ventures - Product Shared Value-Added 
Another form of joint venture that has surfaced in recent 
years is one in which both partners participate and share in 
similar value-adding activities (e.g., both design, produce and 
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market jointly) . 
partners pool 
Unlike the specialization ventures in which 
complementary strengths, shared value-added 
ventures involve partners with relatively equal competencies. 
These ventures are closely related to the "Y-Form" described by 
Porter and Fuller (1986) . Shared value-added ventures are 
particularly useful for firms that face growing levels of risk 
and faster organizational learning when developing new products 
and technologies that approach global MES, such as commercial 
aircraft and robotics. Some of the economic and competitive 
motives prompting shared value-added ventures include: 
* fast upgrading and assimilation of different 
technologies and skills for a given product 
class by learning a partner's skills; 
* desire to shape the evolution of competitive 
activity in that industry; and 
* economies of scale that neither partner can 
generate alone. 
Some of the most recently consummated shared value-added 
ventures include IBM and Siemens to design and produce the next 
generation of 64-megabit chips, Fuji-Xerox in photocopying and 
imaging, Corning Glass's numerous ventures with partners in glass 
and fiber optics, and Texas Instrument and Hitachi in computer 
chips. When compared with specialization ventures, shared value-
added ventures depend even more upon understanding and the 
harmonization of different cultural values for effective 
implementation. Not only are the switching costs commensurately 
higher, but also are the risks for unintended technology loss and 
the "de-skilling" described by Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989). 
Since these ventures involve constant day-to-day contact between 
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managers along the same- value-adding activities, mutual 
adjustment constantly manages the problems of high reciprocal 
interdependence. Table 5 presents the organization design 
characteristics of shared value-added ventures. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Shared value-added ventures are organized along product 
lines, instead of functions. Because partnering involves 
bringing together similar or related strengths and competencies, 
structural dimensions of formalization, specialization, 
standardization and centralization are likely to be low. As 
risks in technology development grow, levels of differentiation 
will remain low to provide the possible benefits of faster 
learning and economies of scale that otherwise would be greatly 
diminished in a highly differentiated venture. The "center of 
integration" is more complex and costlier than those of 
specialization ventures. They often involve a combination of 
linking roles, task forces and committees to integrate across 
many different skill sets brought by both partners. Continuous 
everyday contact between managers requires integrative efforts 
that move steadily closer to a team-based approach and away from 
cumbersome hierarchical mechanisms. Control strategies and 
mechanisms for managing shared value-added ventures reflect both 
the need for bureaucracy and clan approaches. Providing the 
context for building scale economies requires some degree of 
bureaucratic control, while learning and nuturing new skills 
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demand a high level of managerial autonomy. In addition, reward 
systems are also likely to reflect a hierarchical pattern (Kerr 
and Slocum, 1987), because it is difficult to quantify specific 
measures of technological innovation, skill upgrading and 
organizational learning by individual members. 
An example of how global firms have dealt with the problem 
of reconciling different cultural values into shared value-added 
ventures is provided Corning Glass Works and its numerous global 
partners. Corning's series of ventures represents a novel 
approach to understanding and managing disparate cultural values, 
whose maladjustment could easily compromise the alliance's 
stability and usefulness. 
Corning Glass Works 
different global ventures. 
is currently involved in some 
Its partners include Siemens 
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for 
fiber optics, Ciba-Geigy in medical diagnostic equipment, Samsung 
in fiber optics and television tubes, Asahi glass in new optics 
fabrication technology, and several other ventures in China and 
elsewhere. Faced with a plethora of different cultures, Corning 
manages each of its ventures in the following way to ensure 
effective implementation. First, the company undertakes a long 
"pre-nuptial" courtship with each prospective alliance partner to 
assess its motives and its management quality. Only after top 
management is comfortable with the prospective partner do 
negotiations on alliance formation continue. Second, Corning 
does not insist upon complete dominance in each venture; instead, 
it does not hesitate to use the Corning name in a secondary role 
(e.g., Ciba-Corning, Siecor, Samsung-Corning, Dow-Corning). This 
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helps downplay the need for imposing U.S. values upon a disparate 
set of different alliance partners. In effect, Corning tries to 
integrate itself with the values brought by the other parent firm 
to the joint venture. Third, Corning believes in giving each 
joint venture considerable autonomy and insists that its partner 
do the same. By providing real autonomy from corporate parents, 
managers from both sides have the scope and discretion to engage 
in the kind of day-to-day compromising and personal negotiation 
that is necessary for stability and learning. This element is 
also consistent with U.S. managers' propensity for relatively 
low levels of power distance. 
In another setting that highlights the critical role of 
values in implementing global alliances, AT & T has become adroit 
in formulating and implementing its series of strategic alliances 
across Europe. The U. S. telecommunications and computer giant 
has been anxious to expand its presence across the continent, but 
stumbled in one of its earliest joint ventures with Olivetti of 
Italy. Unlike Corning Glass Works, in which the U. S. partner 
fully understood the need for harmonizing and smoothing out 
different cultural value differences, AT & T approached its 
venture with Olivetti without recognizing the salient differences 
between U. S. and Italian cultural values and operating styles. 
Originally conceived as a vehicle for sharing production and 
marketing of computers, the venture ran into serious 
implementation difficulties. Many of these difficulties stemmed 
from each partner misinterpreting different cultural values and 
behavioral patterns. Olivetti, an old-line Italian firm, is 
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likely to have embraced many of these value characteristics: 
medium power distance, relatively high uncertainty avoidance, 
high masculinity and medium-to-high individualism. The u. s. 
firm is likely to rate significantly lower in uncertainty 
avoidance and much higher in individualism (the highest according 
to Hosftede's scale). Some of the deep cultural differences that 
manifested themselves in day-to-day relationships included 
Olivetti's allegations of AT & T's insistence that the venture 
solve its own problems (resulting from differences in 
individualism), heavy-handedness in negotiations (an outcome of 
high individualism and power distance) and less emphasis on 
structuring venture activities (emanating from the U. S. firm's 
lower uncertainty avoidance) . In addition, what complicated the 
venture's life was a gradual but discernible divergence in the 
partner's original missions: telecommunications and computers 
did not converge as quickly as either firm believed. Both sides 
had different opinions concerning a myriad of short and long-term 
financial results. 
The difficulties AT & T experienced with Olivetti may have 
actually helped the u. s. company not only learn more of the 
European marketplace, but understand different values and 
cultures across nations. In managing its series of alliances 
with other partners, such es Italtel of Italy, Telefonica of 
Spain, and N. v. Philips of the Netherlands, AT & T took an 
approach similar to that of Corning: maintaining a low public 
profile to avoid a perception of dominance, r~lying more on local 
nationals to give an accurate picture of domestic political and 
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economic conditions, and creating a European, rather than 
American, identity. 
Finally, another venture in which the u. s. partner had to 
understand and manage deep cultural differences is that of 
General Electric's jet-engine venture with Snecma of France. 
Conceived originally as means for both firms to participate in 
supplying aircraft built by Airbus Industrie, the GE-Snecma deal 
is now among the most successful ventures in Europe, with over 
$11 billion in commitments secured in 1989. Snecma, once a 
government-controlled concern, is likely to have exemplified many 
of France's distinctive cultural characteristics: relatively 
high power distance, very high uncertainty avoidance, medium-to-
low masculinity and medium individualism. On all four 
dimensions, the u. s. scores significantly different, especially 
with a lower uncertainty avoidance, higher masculinity and lower 
power distance. These differences manifested themselves in the 
way the French side would approach problems. According to 
executives in the venture, the French managers viewed problem-
solving through data accumulation, while U. S. managers were more 
intuitive (reflecting the differences in uncertainty avoidance) . 
The French also preferred to bring in executives from their air 
force and government, while GE prefers to use its own executives 
(power distance and masculinity differences) . Nevertheless, the 
venture has worked well not only because of its SO-SO structure, 
but also because both sides have given their senior executives 
broad responsibility to manage the day-to-day operations. 
Although both firms share equally in the production and marketing 
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of the engines, some specific tasks have been divided among the 
partners to speed up production time: GE manages most of the 
system design and high-technology work, while Snecma builds the 
' 
fans, boosters, and turbines. 
Shared value-adding ventures enable firms to participate 
across a host of different technologies and skills contributed by 
both partners. The meshing of disparate cultural values from the 
parent firms into the venture entails significant changes in the 
reward sytems to nurture close, day-to-day contact between 
managers. The examples of Corning Glass Works and A T & T show 
how firms must often change their venture policies every time a 
new partner from a different culture is brought in. Successful 
implementation of these ventures depends upon both partners' 
recognition of the critical role values play in organization 
design and learning. As Corning found out, every venture is 
different and requires mutual adjustment because of the value 
differences found across the world. Nevertheless, successful 
shared value-adding ventures entail both partners to ensure that 
the venture has sufficient enough autonomy to chart its own path, 
and if necessary, to allow the managers themselves to create and 
redesign the venture's unique reward systems and culture to 
encourage learning from one another. 
Chaebol a 
While there are many similarities between Japanese keiretsus 
and South Korean chaebols, Steers, Shin and Ungson (1989) 
carefully delineate these differences. We have chosen to focus 
on chaebols in this section of the paper since all chaebols share 
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similar characteristics. A chaebol is a South Korean business 
group consisting of large companies that are owned and managed by 
family members or relatives in diversified businesses that 
produce an array of products for the global marketplace. Some of 
the largest chaebols are Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar, 
Daewoo, and Sunkyong. 
According to Steers, et al., (1989) and Yoo and Lee (1987), 
chaebols share some common organizational features that reflect 
the cultural values of Korean society. First, these are 
controlled by families through stock ownership. This is 
important since the Korean cultural tradition places 
responsibility on the eldest son to inherit most family property 
and assume decision making responsibility. Family members hold 
both financial and top management positions. 
are managed by one strong paternalistic figure. 
Second, chaebols 
The CEO assumes 
personal responsibility for' most decisions and, as such, makes 
many of the decisions. This is rooted in the Confucian tradition 
that requires the decision makers to balance the needs of the 
organization and the harmony of the group. Decision making is 
centralized and the structure is highly formalized. For example, 
Chung Ju-Yung, founder and former chairman of the Hyundai Group, 
made all decisions. No one dared to challenge him (high power 
distance). Every morning between 6:00 and 6:30, he would receive 
telephone calls from Hyundai' s foreign operations. This high 
degree of centralization of decision making is characteristic in 
most chaebols (high uncertainty avoidance). It is the 
subordinate's job to make his superior's decision work and not 
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question it. Third, there are centralized planning and 
coordination boards. The primary functions of these are to 
analyze data and present recommendations to the chairmen for 
decision making. Usually each member organization explains to 
the board what he has accomplished and plans to do. The planning 
board often plays a major role in personnel decisions. This 
group is responsible for screening all candidates and assigning 
college graduates hired by ~he chaebol to member organizations. 
These actions ensure continuity and coordination across 
organizations. This group is also responsible for overseeing the 
overall salary and bonus system used within each chaebol. 
Fourth, there are close personal ties between the government and 
the chaebols. The government uses its power through preferential 
loans and interest, licensing authorizations, and through the 
inclusion of companies in its five-year economic development 
plans. To assure continued success, the chaebols support the 
incumbent political party, and make donations to the "right" 
causes. Failure to accomplish these activities has lead to 
termination of financing and bankruptcy as in the case of Kukje 
Group. Finally, educational credentials are critical to a 
manger's success. Attending a prestigious Korean college almost 
guarantees the student with a job with one of the best companies. 
For example, at Lucky-Goldstar, of the fifteen top executives, 
73% graduated from Seoul National University; at Samsung, 55% 
graduated from Seoul National University; and in Sunkyong, 75% 
graduated from Seoul National University. School ties are 
important in a status-oriented society (high masculinity) and 
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assure that the newcomer has a value system embraced by the 
chaebol's elite management team. 
These characteristics greatly affect the designs of chaebols 
as shown in Table 6. South Korean managers place more emphasis 
Insert Table 6 about here 
on personal contacts and relationships than written contracts. 
In licensing joint ventures, for example, personal relationships 
are often utilized to secure a business deal, but little time is 
spent on nurturing these. Lawyers and written contracts most 
often dedicate the relationships of the parties. In chaebols, 
interpersonal networking across members' organizations in the 
chaebol is fostered by the movement of personnel across 
organizations and the active role of the planning group in 
influencing personnel practices. Most Korean managers spend 
considerable time in developing and nurturing personal 
relationships. These relationships govern decision making. When 
a manager submits his proposal for a new product to his peers, it 
is called "pummi." This serves to tell others of the new venture 
and diffuse responsibility for decision implementation quickly 
after a decision has been made. Maintaining personal 
relationships and enhancing mutual gains are critical in such 
situations. 
According to Steers, ,et al. (1989), another aspect of 
maintaining personal relationships is the concept of "nunch'i." 
Nunch'i roughly translates as "the look in someone's eyes." 
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Korean managers pride themselves in their ability to read 
someone's face. In developing personal relationships, nonverbal 
behavior is critical. There is a Korean proverb that translates 
"One who does not have nunch'i cannot succeed." The ability to 
silently read the other manager's mind and to understand the 
problem from that manager's perspective is salient. 
Relationships and not legal contracts govern decisions. 
~plications ~or Organization Scientists 
Global strategic alliances are increasingly being viewed as 
critical vehicles by which U. S. firms may hope to compete in the 
global marketplace and to keep up with the rapid pace of 
technology development. Although research interest in strategic 
alliances has grown steadily during the 1980s, advances in 
economics, business policy and organizational theory have only 
recently begun to develop new models and conceptual frameworks by 
which to examine and classify specific types of alliances and 
their supporting organization designs. 
During the 1960s, most -theoretical and empirical studies in 
these fields focused on examining economic behavior of single-
business and vertically-integrated firms in domestic, 
oligopolistic settings. With the advent of resource scarcity and 
inflation during the 1970s, business policy and organizational 
theory researchers focused on such issues as diversification and 
resource dependency. The strategic business unit (SBU) was the 
unit of analysis. The 1980s brought the full impact of global 
competition and economic restructuring home to U. S. firms, and 
research studies are now beginning to reflect this trend. As we 
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enter into the 1990s, organizational science needs to balance its 
focus of examining domestic and unitary organizations with global 
networks and hybrid arrangements. Additional theory development 
is especially needed concerning alliances and other hybrid 
organizational arrangements that involve parties from two or more 
different cultural value systems. Consequently, a fertile ground 
for multidisciplinary approaches and research exists and will 
continue to grow. 
From an economics, transactions-cost perspective, Borys and 
Jemison (1989) note that strategic alliances may be thought of as 
hybrid organizational arrangements that lay somewhere between 
"markets and hierarchies" (Thorelli, 1986; Williamson, 1985) . 
Viewed in this way, alliances represent alternative 
organizational networks that transfer and distribute new benefits 
among the original partners--benefits that neither partner could 
have garnered on its own. Alliances, when considered as 
organizational networks, are presumed to function in a fairly 
stable manner as long as economic conditions for optimizing 
efficiency exist (Jarillo, 1988) . While a pure transactions-cost 
approach to examining alliances can provide some useful platforms 
for building theory, the major pitfall of this perspective is 
that it tends not to consider potential contingency influences 
(e.g., product life-cycle, technological intensity) that could 
provide more insight into selecting the actual mode of alliance 
configuration. Moreover, a transactions-cost perspective assumes 
that the parties to the alliance share a common set of underlying 
economic assumptions, similar propensity for opportunism, and 
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tolerance for ambiguity--factors which may not weigh equally 
across different cultures. 
From the business policy perspective, strategic alliances 
are viewed increasingly as mechanisms to enhance organizational 
learning of new skills and capabilities to build sources of 
competitive advantage (Bettis and Pinkley, 1991; Hamel, Doz and 
Prahalad, 1989; Harrigan, 1985; Ohrnae, 1989). Unlike the pure 
transactions-cost approach, researchers in business policy have 
developed numerous theories concerning the rise and purposes of 
alliances. The recent' focus on strategic alliances, 
organizational networks and other hybrid arrangements as new 
research areas is a timely development, given the field's 
continued emphasis on building a multidisciplinary approach to 
theory development and inquiry. However, it deemphasizes the 
relative importance of cultural values in managing operational 
issues within the alliance itself. 
Yet, to develop theories and studies that are able to 
simultaneously reconcile the need to understand economic and 
strategic behavior with a multicultural perspective is indeed a 
challenging task. Economics and environmental changes may give 
rise to numerous opportunities for developing theories concerning 
strategy formulation, but an understanding of how different 
cultures are likely to interact and to relate is a vital linchpin 
to strategy implementation, particularly in alliances, networks, 
and hybrid arrangements. 
~plication& for Managers 
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In his scintillating book, the Icarus Paradox, Danny Miller 
(1990) comments that organizations are always changing. 
Organization design processes are dynamic. The strategic 
alliances that we outlined in our chapter have initial themes 
that characterize their structure, information processing 
capabilities, control and reward systems. These features create 
a development path that facilitates organizational learning in 
each strategic alliance. At the same time, these alliances resist 
change for several reasons. First, alliances are shaped by a 
consistent array of structural dimensions and control systems. 
These determine the standards of success, what information is 
attended to, and what behaviors the reward system reinforces. It 
also establishes routines that create premises for learning. In 
fact, each alliance controls the amount and scope of learning. 
And this makes it very hard for managers to recognize 
fundamentally new problems that were never envisioned in 
designing the alliance originally. Second, alliances resist 
change because they are inextricably embedded in the political 
interests of managers who have benefitted from the arrangement. 
Successful managers have learned and internalized a repertory of 
strategic skills and resources and have honed these. Third, 
characteristics of each alliance's structure are mutually 
reinforcing. Try to change one in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the culture, reward system, etc., and the others will force 
it back into place. 
Given these assumptions, Miller argues that organizations 
keep recreating themselves in their own image. They determine 
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their future according to how their top managers perceive their 
environment and programs of the past. This perspective inexorably 
moves the organization toward a narrow focus of conformity, and 
one that is resistant to change. 
Efforts to redesign firms away from a domestic to a global 
focus demand an understanding of the economics of global 
competition, as well as implementation processes that are 
intrinsic to alliance stability. As a firm's scope of alliance 
activity becomes more sophisticated, senior mangement must 
reframe its past behaviors to the critical role of coalescing 
different culture values for successful implementation and 
organizational learning. All too often, however, this task is 
often presumed as a given, leading to alliance instability and 
the loss of valuable partners that can help shape future industry 
evolution and the scope of competitive activity results. 
Each type of strategic alliance requires organizational 
learning. Single-loop relearning processes establish efficient 
routines that galvanize cultures, structures, reward systems, and 
modes of integration. These contribute greatly to the alliance's 
stability. One unintended consequence of single-loop learning is 
that it limits focus. Monolithic corporate cultures consolidate 
controls around core competencies, just as well accepted routines 
greatly improve efficiency and coordination. However, both 
reduce organizational flexibility. For example, chaebols have 
achieved their economic brilliance at the expense of an 
individual's organization's autonomy. At Samsung, there is an 
emphasis on technological development, especially in 
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semiconductors and genetic engineering. The bulk of Sarnsung' s 
brightest employees and resources are in that business segment. 
Since resources are limited, those organizations in Sarnsung' s 
culture and social welfare business segment are sacrificed. To 
excel requires trade-offs, concentration, and dedication. 
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